China Urged to Fortify Subsea Cable Defences Amid Sabotage Concerns

Beijing should establish its own law to safeguard underwater fibre optic cables, a Shanghai Maritime University law professor has stated. This recommendation comes amidst increasing global apprehension regarding potential sabotage of essential ocean infrastructure. These cables transmit approximately 99 percent of the world's intercontinental data, facing threats in critical areas such as the Red Sea and the Baltic Sea.

Sub Sea Cables

Professor Guo Ran, writing in the policy journal Democracy and Legal System recently, outlined China's significant interest in protecting these cables. The nation is a prominent coastal state and a principal investor in the Digital Silk Road, a programme to build global digital and telecommunications infrastructure. The infrastructure serves as the physical foundation for global artificial intelligence systems. The China Law Society, a state run organisation which provides legislative advice, supervises the journal.

China has implemented both a Data Security Law and a Cybersecurity Law to regulate its digital domain. But these existing legal frameworks primarily focus on data processing and cross border data flows. Physical seabed infrastructure currently remains largely unregulated under Chinese domestic law. And Professor Guo advocates for a new legal provision to bridge this gap.

He explained that traditional international maritime law does not adequately address modern grey zone warfare tactics. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) protects the freedom to lay cables, yet offers limited defence against grey zone activities. Such actions include foreign vessels dragging anchors or severing crucial seabed lines, often while operating under flag state immunity. This leaves affected coastal nations with minimal enforcement power in international waters.

Professor Guo stated that the central question revolves around what jurisdiction coastal states, flag states, landing states, and affected states each hold in varying maritime areas. He detailed the challenge of how international law can maintain a balance among freedom of navigation, freedom of laying cables, flag state jurisdiction, and critical infrastructure security when addressing intentional destruction, gross negligence, and grey zone actions. These global data pathways have become a significant area of contention in the US China technology rivalry. Big Tech demand for safe and reliable data transfers, driven by the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and global finance, fuels this competition.

The US Federal Communications Commission recently adopted new rules designed to accelerate the deployment of submarine cables. Reports indicated that the US plans to allocate USD 175.8 million to replace older lines in the Caribbean and Central America, a move aimed at preventing Chinese participation. Beijing subsequently accused Washington of politicising global underwater cable networks.

Australia and New Zealand have also taken steps to establish marine cable protection zones. These zones are designed to shield vital underwater communications infrastructure from human induced damage, including trawling, dredging, fishing, and anchoring activities. So, these measures recognise the inherent vulnerabilities.

Professor Guo proposed that China could implement no anchor zones in sensitive, high risk straits and fishing grounds. He further suggested expanding the nation's own underwater repair capacity. This would reduce reliance on foreign ships should infrastructure damage occur. He also outlined the potential use of satellite surveillance, underwater drones, and seabed sensors, alongside cross agency coordination, to manage and protect its undersea cables more effectively.

Designating subsea cables as critical information infrastructure within this new law would accord them the same high level state protection as national power grids and nuclear facilities. Building a robust domestic legal framework would not only strengthen China's national security, but also position the country as a rule maker in global seabed digital governance, according to Professor Guo. He concluded that China should establish a governance system for international subsea cable security that possesses both international legal legitimacy and practical defence capabilities. He added that only by developing enforceable, collaborative, and reviewable security rules, while also safeguarding maritime freedom, can protection for international subsea cables truly be enhanced, helping shape global digital infrastructure governance.

• China has been urged to create a specific law for protecting its underwater fibre optic cables.

• Current Chinese laws do not cover physical seabed infrastructure, leaving it vulnerable to grey zone warfare tactics.

• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides limited protection against deliberate cable damage in international waters.

• The recommendation comes amidst heightened US China technology rivalry and increasing demand for data transfer by Big Tech.

• Proposed measures include no anchor zones, expanded repair capacity, and advanced surveillance technologies.

Source: SCMP